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CONTRACTING IN THE DARK: CASTING LIGHT ON
THE SHADOWS OF SECOND LEVEL AGREEMENTS
ABSTRACT
In the early days of the Internet, copyright owners concentrated on
eliminating infringement threats posed by the new technology. Today,
many copyright owners are partnering with major user-generated content
platforms in order to participate in and receive compensation for some
third-party infringement occurring on the Internet. YouTube pioneered such
partnership arrangements in 2006 with a new kind of copyright license
now referred to as a “second level agreement.” In 2008, YouTube unveiled
Content ID, which streamlined the process for entering into second level
agreements with the site. This Note analyzes Content ID and the second
level agreements underlying it to determine how the average YouTube
uploader is legally affected, and how the agreements square with federal
copyright law when Content ID does not adequately safeguard against
false ownership claims.
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INTRODUCTION
When a new technology emerges that can exploit copyrighted works,
copyright owners have three basic options: do nothing, try to eliminate the
new kind of dissemination, or participate in it and receive compensation.1 In
the early 2000s, copyright owners concentrated on eliminating the rising
infringement threats posed by the Internet by shutting down file-sharing
programs and suing the users of those programs.2 Today user-generated content (UGC) platforms3—websites like YouTube, MySpace, and Yahoo—
present an opportunity for copyright owners to participate in and receive
compensation for some third-party exploitation occurring on the Internet.4
Many major UGC platforms enter into licensing agreements with copyright owners, turning potential courtroom opponents into business partners
with the stroke of a pen.5 Yafit Lev-Aretz coined the term “second level
agreements” to describe these licenses in her 2012 article by the same name.6
Lev-Aretz succinctly describes this new breed of copyright license:
While a First Level Agreement involves the copyright owner on the one
hand and the [UGC platform] user on the other, Second Level Agreements
are negotiated and executed by copyright owners and platform operators.
In other words, Second Level Agreements authorize unidentified uses of
copyrighted content by users in UGC platforms.7

YouTube is probably the most popular UGC platform today and pioneered the development of these agreements in 2006.8 The first second
1

See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control Over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1613–14 (2001).
2
See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2001); John Borland, RIAA
Sues 261 File Swappers, C|NET (Sept. 8, 2003, 10:57 AM), http://news.cnet.com
/2100-1023_3-5072564.html.
3
“UGC is often defined as content uploaded and sometimes created by Internet users,
rather than produced by the website itself.” Yafit Lev-Aretz, Second Level Agreements,
45 AKRON L. REV. 137, 142 (2012).
4
See, e.g., Brian Stelter, Some Media Companies Choose to Profit from Pirated
YouTube Clips, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2008, at C1 (“After years of regarding pirated
video on YouTube as a threat, some major media companies are having a change of
heart, treating it instead as an advertising opportunity.”).
5
See generally, Lev-Aretz, supra note 3.
6
Lev-Aretz, supra note 3, at 138–39.
7
Id. at 152.
8
Id. at 140, 155–56 (“YouTube was initiated in February 2005.... YouTube’s popularity in its first years was mainly due to the copyrighted material users uploaded to the
site.... Attempting to avoid lawsuits and to make YouTube a better source for profit,
[YouTube’s parent company] Google has entered into content partnerships with various
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level agreements were individually negotiated between YouTube and major
music conglomerates.9 YouTube now enters into these agreements en masse
through its popular service, Content ID.10 Content ID streamlines the contracting process with a simple online form11 and implements special technology
that automatically searches YouTube’s digital library for videos containing the copyrighted material that claimants12 provide.13 Most claimants use
Content ID to permit otherwise infringing videos to remain on YouTube in
exchange for a percentage of the advertising revenue the videos generate.14
At first blush, Content ID deftly preserves the status quo on YouTube
with minimal disruption to the visitor experience: copyright owners gain
control over the use of their works on the site and receive compensation,
YouTube contracts out of infringement liability, and YouTube visitors retain
access to a variety of copyrighted content (which was largely responsible for
the site’s early popularity15) in exchange for viewing a few advertisements.
But this synopsis excludes one key party: the people who create and upload
those otherwise infringing videos (the user-creators). This synopsis also fails
to account for a phenomenon known as Content ID abuse, which occurs when
dishonest claimants use Content ID to profit from works to which they do
not own valid copyrights (usually public domain works).16
This Note analyzes Content ID and the second level agreements underlying it to determine how the user-creator is legally affected and how the
agreements square with federal copyright law when Content ID does not
adequately safeguard against abuse. Part I surveys the traditional copyright
law implications for user-creators and YouTube prior to the advent of
music and entertainment companies. The first Second Level Agreement took place in
2006 ....”).
9
Id. at 152, 156.
10
See, e.g., Content Identification Application, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com
/content_id_signup (last visited Jan. 12, 2014); David King, Making Money on YouTube
with Content ID, GOOGLE BLOG (Aug. 27, 2008), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008
/08/making-money-on-youtube-with-content-id.html; Stelter, supra note 4.
11
Content Identification Application, supra note 10.
12
I use the term “claimant” to refer to anyone who signs up for Content ID. Usually,
that means the bona fide owner of the copyrighted material submitted during the Content ID
application process. See How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com
/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) (“YouTube only grants Content
ID to content owners who meet specific criteria. To be approved, content owners must
own exclusive rights to a substantial body of original material that is frequently uploaded
by the YouTube user community.”); infra Part II. But see infra Part IV.
13
How Content ID Works, supra note 12.
14
See infra Part II.
15
Lev-Aretz, supra note 3, at 155.
16
Patrick McKay, YouTube Copyfraud & Abuse of the Content ID System, FAIR USE
TUBE (Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.fairusetube.org/youtube-copyfraud.
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second level agreements. Part II explains how Content ID works and how
it alters the legal framework laid out in Part I. Part III proposes that Content
ID impliedly grants a license from the copyright owner to the user-creator.
Part IV addresses Content ID abuse and urges YouTube to more fairly balance users’ interests by instituting up-front copyright ownership verification
in the Content ID application process and by promulgating clear guidelines
and penalties for abusers.
I. LEGAL BACKDROP OF CONTENT ID
Numa Numa17 is one of the most viewed viral Internet videos of all
time,18 and will help illustrate the following survey of traditional copyright
infringement liability pre–Content ID. In a low-quality home video, a teenage
boy with the YouTube account name xloserkidx lip-synchs and performs an
interpretive dance to O-Zone’s Romanian-language hit song, Numa Numa,19
in what appears to be his childhood bedroom. When Numa Numa was uploaded in 2006, YouTube probably displayed banner advertisements across
the top of the screen and collected all the ad revenue generated by the
video’s hundreds of millions of views.20 Before Content ID created an incentive to leave the video on the site by giving copyright owners direct access
to the ad revenue pie, O-Zone was probably reluctant to remove the video
through prescribed statutory means21 due to other market and reputational
concerns.22 For example, the video’s popularity may have contributed to increased album sales, and the band may have worried that removing the highprofile video would lead to a backlash from music fans.23 The chance of
17

xloserkidx, Numa Numa, YOUTUBE (Aug. 14, 2006), http://www.youtube.com/watch
?v=60og9gwKh1o.
18
As of December 2006, only six months after its original upload, the video had over
700 million views, making it the second-most viewed YouTube video at that time. See, e.g.,
Most Viral Video of All Time, MSNBC (Dec. 1, 2006, 11:12 AM), http://www.msnbc
.msn.com/id/15958470/ns/msnbc-countdown_with_keith_olbermann/t/most-viral-video-all
-time/; Star Wars Kid Is Top Viral Video, BBC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2006, 12:26 GMT), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/6187554.stm.
19
Unless otherwise indicated, Numa Numa refers to the YouTube video, not the song
itself.
20
See Complaint ¶ 37, Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 461
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 1:07CV02103), 2007 WL 775611 (“[A]dvertisers pay YouTube to
display banner advertising to users whenever they log on to, search for, and view infringing videos.”).
21
17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(3) (West 2013); see also infra Part IV.
22
Assume that the band O-Zone exclusively owns all rights to the song.
23
Music fans responded to Metallica’s aggressive campaign against peer-to-peer file
sharing network Napster and its users in the early 2000s with the “Boycott Metallica” movement. Ron Kaufman, Boycott Metallica, KILL YOUR TELEVISION (Aug. 21, 2001, 11:50 AM),
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minimal collateral financial gain and the fear of negative press probably
kept O-Zone from enforcing its rights to remove the video from the site
and to sue YouTube and xloserkidx for infringement.
This Part of the Note sets O-Zone’s incentives aside and surveys the
copyright law landscape prior to second level agreements and Content ID.
In other words, it considers O-Zone’s ability, not its desire, to vindicate its
rights regarding the video prior to Content ID. Subparts A and B outline
direct and secondary infringement liability theories. Subpart C introduces the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and explains how it limits ISP
liability, severely curtailing O-Zone’s and other similarly situated copyright
owners’ ability to recover from YouTube.24 Subpart D discusses Viacom
International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., which threatened to remove YouTube’s
DMCA protection and tip the scale back into copyright owners’ favor.
Viacom was, therefore, a major catalyst for developing Content ID, and it
sets the stage for a thorough analysis of the service.25
A. Direct Infringement Liability Under the Copyright Act
At the height of Numa Numa’s popularity, O-Zone could have easily
established prima facie claims for direct infringement against xloserkidx
and YouTube. Section 501 of the Copyright Act provides for direct infringement liability.26 Courts generally follow the two-pronged test for direct infringement set out in Arnstein v. Porter,27 which requires a plaintiff to
prove (1) “that defendant copied from the plaintiff’s copyrighted work” and
(2) “that the copying ... constitute[d] improper appropriation.”28 Improper
appropriation has its own two-pronged test, which requires a plaintiff to prove
(1) “that the defendant’s work appropriated protected expression from the
copyrighted work” and (2) “that audiences will perceive substantial similarities between the defendant’s work and the plaintiff’s protected expression.”29
By making a clear analog copy of the entire recording of the song in his
video, xloserkidx satisfied both elements of infringement in a textbook-like
http://web.archive.org/web/20010821115030/http://www.netreach.net/~kaufman/metallica
.html (accessed by searching for the original URL in the Internet Archive).
24
See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512.
25
See supra note 8 and accompanying text; Kevin J. Delaney, YouTube to Test Software
to Ease Licensing Fights, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2007, 11:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com
/article/SB118161295626932114.html.
26
17 U.S.C.A § 501(a) (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner ... is an infringer ....”).
27
154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 2 GOLDSTEIN ON
COPYRIGHT § 9.1 n.2 (3d ed. 2005).
28
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
29
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, § 9.3.1.
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manner. YouTube satisfied both elements in a similarly straightforward
manner when xloserkidx uploaded the video to the site because YouTube’s
computer systems created a copy of the video—including its audio component—to store in YouTube’s digital database.30
B. Secondary Infringement Liability at Common Law
O-Zone might have established prima facie claims for secondary infringement against YouTube as well. Two theories of secondary infringement liability have developed at common law: vicarious and contributory.31
Under these theories, YouTube could be liable for xloserkidx’s direct infringement if certain conditions are met.
The leading case on vicarious liability, Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.
L. Green Co., found the owner of a chain of record stores liable for direct
infringement committed by one of its record dealers.32 Establishing vicarious
liability requires (1) “the right and ability to supervise” and (2) “an obvious
and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials—
even in the absence of actual knowledge” of the direct infringement.33
A defendant may be liable for contributory infringement if he (1) had
actual or constructive “know[ledge] of the infringing activity” and (2) “acted
in concert with the direct infringer—materially inducing, causing or contributing to the conduct of the direct infringer.”34
C. Limited Liability for ISPs Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
The DMCA, enacted in 1998, severely limits monetary and injunctive
relief available to copyright owners from Internet service providers (ISPs)
for both primary and secondary infringement.35 That is, even if O-Zone could
establish a prima facie case of infringement against YouTube, YouTube
could invoke DMCA protection as a defense. Title II of the DMCA,36 commonly referred to as the “safe harbor provision,”37 “endeavors to balance the
30

See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. (Viacom I), 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 518
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining how YouTube functions as a website).
31
See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. (Viacom II), 676 F.3d 19, 28 n.5 (2d Cir.
2012) (listing the doctrines of secondary copyright infringement); see also Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930–31 (2005).
32
316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
33
Id. at 307.
34
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, § 8.1. See also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984).
35
See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (West 2013).
36
Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 512 (2012)).
37
See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff
.org/issues/dmca (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
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interests of [ISPs] and copyright owners when copyright infringement occurs”
on the Internet.38 It immunizes ISPs from monetary relief for certain activities
that otherwise constitute direct, contributory, or vicarious infringement.39
An ISP must meet several threshold requirements to enjoy safe harbor
protection. An ISP must qualify as a “service provider” as defined in the
DMCA.40 A qualifying ISP must implement an account termination policy
according to the DMCA’s specifications, and must “accommodate[] and not
interfere[] with standard technical measures.”41 An ISP that meets those general requirements is eligible for protection for four types of activities, some
of which carry their own additional conditions: (1) transitory digital network
communications, (2) system caching, (3) storing information on systems or
networks at the direction of users, and (4) information location tools.42
YouTube qualifies as a “service provider” for purposes of the safe harbor as “a provider of online services or network access.”43 YouTube stores
information at the direction of users, which is governed by § 512(c) of the
DMCA. YouTube only qualifies for safe harbor protection for that activity
if it:
(A)
(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity
using the material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to, the material;
(B)
does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right
and ability to control such activity; and
(C)
upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the
material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.44

With this last piece of the puzzle in place, the pre–Content ID liability picture is clear: O-Zone has a strong case against xloserkidx and YouTube for
direct infringement, O-Zone may have a prima facie case for secondary
38

Overview, HARVARD UNIV., http://dmca.harvard.edu/pages/overview (last visited
Jan. 12, 2014).
39
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, § 8.3.2; see also 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 504–05, 512 (West 2013).
40
17 U.S.C.A. § 512(k)(1)(A)–(B) (West 2013).
41
Id. § 512(i)(1)(A)–(B); see also id. § 512(i)(2) (defining “standard technical measures” as certain “technical measures that are used by copyright owners to identify or
protect copyrighted works ...”).
42
Id. § 512(a)–(d).
43
Id. § 512(k)(1)(B); Viacom II, 676 F.3d at 39.
44
Viacom I, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 516–17 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)–(C)).
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infringement against YouTube, and the DMCA probably limits O-Zone’s
ability to recover from YouTube under either infringement theory.
Before Content ID, countless other copyright owners were in a similar
position. But unlike O-Zone, some of those similarly situated copyright owners laid claim to many more infringing videos on the site and had greater
financial resources to pursue YouTube in court. On March 13, 2007, the
international media conglomerate Viacom filed suit against YouTube and its
parent company Google in the Southern District of New York.45 Viacom
alleged that YouTube had fallen out of the § 512(c) safe harbor provision,
and sought injunctive relief and at least $1 billion in damages.46
D. Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. and the Inception of Content ID
Viacom alleged that YouTube failed to satisfy the additional requirements for safe harbor protection listed in § 512(c)(1)(A) and (B).47 Viacom’s
theory depended on a broad interpretation of the statute; namely, that
YouTube needed only general knowledge of widespread infringing activity
on its site to lose safe harbor protection.48 To be sure, email correspondence
among YouTube executives evidenced a general awareness of and perhaps
complicity in the presence of infringing videos on the site.49
The ISP and entertainment communities followed Viacom closely, unsure of how the court would interpret “actual knowledge” of infringement,
“aware[ness] of fact or circumstances” indicating infringement, and the “right
and ability to control” user-creators.50 Although the DMCA “endeavors to
balance the interests of [ISPs] and copyright owners,”51 the Viacom decision
would likely represent a thumb on the scale to the affected industries.
In Viacom I, the Southern District of New York granted YouTube’s motion for summary judgment, holding that YouTube was entitled to § 512(c)
safe harbor protection and dismissing all infringement claims.52 In so holding, the court rejected Viacom’s view that “[m]ere knowledge of prevalence
45

Complaint, supra note 20, at 1.
First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 10, 37–39, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 540 F.
Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 1:07-cv-02103 (LLS)), 2008 WL 2062868; see also
Lev-Aretz, supra note 3, at 148–49.
47
Viacom I, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
48
Id. at 518–19.
49
Viacom II, 676 F.3d at 33–34.
50
17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(A)–(B) (West 2013); see, e.g., Amir Hassanabadi, Note,
Viacom v. YouTube—All Eyes Blind: The Limits of the DMCA in a Web 2.0 World, 26
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405, 406–07 (2011).
51
Overview, supra note 38.
52
Viacom I, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
46

314

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:305

of [infringing] activity in general” should disqualify YouTube from safe harbor
protection.53 Instead, the court held that failure to comply with § 512(c)(1)(A)
requires “actual or constructive knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements of individual items.”54 The court held that disqualification under
§ 512(c)(1)(B) also requires item specific knowledge of infringing activity
before YouTube can be said to have the “right and ability to control” the
infringing activity of its users.55
On appeal to the Second Circuit, Viacom II affirmed Viacom I’s interpretation of § 512(c)(1)(A), but remanded the issue of whether YouTube
had disqualifying constructive knowledge of infringement or, alternatively,
had exercised willful blindness.56 The Second Circuit reversed Viacom I’s
interpretation of § 512(c)(1)(B), holding that an ISP’s “right and ability to
control” infringing activity only requires a general awareness of such activity,
and remanded the issue of whether YouTube in fact had the requisite “right
and ability” to control such activity.57 On remand to the Southern District
of New York, Viacom III found for YouTube on each issue and dismissed
Viacom’s claims.58
The Viacom cases chart the evolution of interpreting § 512(c) safe harbor
eligibility, which is of great interest and import to the ISP community. But
the public court battle set into motion potentially far more interesting and
important private licensing developments. When YouTube began testing
Content ID in 2007, a spokesperson for Google acknowledged that its development was necessary to resolve the pending legal dispute with Viacom.59
Because YouTube risked falling out of the safe harbor if the courts sided with
Viacom’s statutory interpretation, YouTube needed a mechanism to appease
copyright owners and immunize itself from infringement liability. YouTube’s
goal was two-fold: mitigate the Viacom litigation and prevent future claims
by other copyright owners.60 As evidence that Viacom found Content ID
53

Id. at 523. YouTube did not dispute that it had general awareness of infringing content residing on its network at the direction of its users. Viacom II, 676 F.3d at 28–29.
54
Viacom I, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 519, 523. The opinions refer to this as “item-specific
knowledge.” Id. at 527; Viacom II, 676 F.3d at 26, 30, 36, 42.
55
Viacom I, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 527.
56
Viacom II, 676 F.3d at 30–32, 41–42.
57
Id. at 35–38, 41–42.
58
Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. (Viacom III), 940 F. Supp. 2d 110, 123
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
59
Delaney, supra note 25 (“Google Chief Executive Eric Schmidt has said that fingerprinting technology is key to resolving copyright battles between media and technology
companies over online video, such as Viacom[,] Inc.’s $1 billion suit against Google filed
in March. Some media executives have accused YouTube of dragging its feet in implementing such technology in order to profit from copyright infringement as long as possible, a
charge the video site has denied.”).
60
See Lev-Aretz, supra note 3, at 155–56.
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to be a satisfactory solution, Viacom did not seek damages for any actions
after YouTube implemented Content ID in 2008.61
II. CONTENT ID
This Part of the Note outlines the nuts and bolts of YouTube and Content
ID, serving as the bridge between the well-trodden copyright law landscape
outlined above and the murky new world of second level agreements explored below.
YouTube operates like most other UGC sites. Any visitor can search for
and watch videos simply by visiting the site, but a YouTube account is required to upload videos and use some other site features, such as commenting on videos and accessing mature content.62 The account is free and the
user must agree to YouTube’s Terms of Service.63 A user can upload video
files from her hard drive or record a video using a webcam.64 YouTube
does not review or approve each uploaded video before making it publicly
accessible.65 Instead, policing is more democratic: users are expected to
use “common-sense” when uploading,66 viewers can “flag” inappropriate
videos,67 and copyright owners can notify YouTube of infringing videos.68
Any copyright owner may participate in Content ID, although it was originally “designed for exclusive rights holders whose content is frequently
uploaded to YouTube by the user community.”69 In order to participate, the
61

Miguel Helft, Judge Sides with Google in Viacom Video Suit, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
2010, at B1.
62
YouTube Essentials, YOUTUBE (Mar. 4, 2013, 9:38 PM), http://wayback.archive.org
/web/20130304213858/http://www.youtube.com/t/about_essentials (accessed by searching
for YouTube Essentials in the Internet Archive index).
63
Sign up for an Account on YouTube, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/you tube
/answer/161805?hl=en (last visited Jan. 12, 2014); Create a New Google Account, GOOGLE,
https://accounts.google.com/SignUp?service=youtube (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
64
How to Upload Videos, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/579
24?hl=en (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
65
Id.; see also Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.google
.com/intl/en/policies/terms/ (stating that, across all of Google’s products and services,
“content is the sole responsibility of the entity that makes it available”).
66
YouTube Community Guidelines, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/community
_guidelines (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
67
Flagging Content, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2802027
?hl=en (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
68
Copyright Infringement Notification Basics, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/yt
/copyright/copyright-complaint.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
69
Content ID, YOUTUBE (Jan. 6, 2013, 5:01 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20130
106170131/http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (accessed by searching for the original
URL in the Internet Archive). Slightly modified language appears on the current version
of the site. See supra note 12.
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copyright owner fills out a short form70 and delivers a reference file of the
claimed content to YouTube.71 The copyright owner selects in advance the
course of action to be taken when that content is identified: block, track, or
monetize.72 Blocking makes the video unplayable or mutes the audio.73
Tracking provides the content owner with video viewership statistics.74
Monetizing inserts advertisements before the video or lays them over the
video,75 and YouTube shares the generated ad revenue with the content
owner.76 Through an automated process, using a combination of video fingerprinting technology created by Google and audio fingerprinting technology
licensed from Audible Magic,77 Content ID scans YouTube’s library of useruploaded videos and applies the owner’s selected course of action whenever a
match is found.78 A user may dispute a Content ID match if she believes it
was an error,79 a process discussed in greater depth in Part IV. According to
YouTube’s parent company Google, as of 2008, copyright owners opting
into an early test version of Content ID chose to monetize ninety percent
of claims.80
III. LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS FORMED BY CONTENT ID
Content ID creates an express contractual nonexclusive licensing agreement between YouTube and the claimant, just like the early, individually
70

Content Identification Application, supra note 10.
How Content ID Works, supra note 12.
72
Id.; see also Liz Gannes, From Monitor to Monetize: The Evolution of YouTube
Content ID, GIGAOM (Sept. 28, 2009, 9:00 AM), http://gigaom.com/2009/09/28/from-moni
tor-to-monetize-the-evolution-of-youtube-content-id/ (“[T]oday, YouTube’s Content ID is a
market standard, with every major U.S. network broadcaster, movie studio, and record
label using it …. More than 1,000 content owners have uploaded more than 1 million reference files to the system, and the majority of partners elect to leave infringing content up
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YOUTUBE BIZ BLOG (Sept. 16, 2009, 10:36 AM), http://ytbizblog.blogspot.com/2009/09
/over-1000-content-owners-now-using.html.
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negotiated second level agreements between YouTube and particular major
copyright owners.81 Content ID scans its database for reference file matches,
meaning YouTube acquires disqualifying item specific knowledge even when
YouTube does not profit from the infringing videos.82 Therefore, § 512(c)
safe harbor protection is no longer available, and YouTube needs a license
to avoid committing secondary infringement.
The contractual relationships created by Content ID might be viewed this
way: the copyright owner is the licensor, YouTube is the licensee, and the
user-creator is a non-contracting party—perhaps a “tolerated” infringer or the
beneficiary of a waiver. This Note argues that a better view is that Content
ID creates an implied, nonexclusive, royalty-free license between the copyright owner and the user-creator, which is limited in scope by YouTube’s
Terms of Service and the terms of the second level agreement.
A. Theories of Tolerated Use and Waiver
Because the user-creator is not an express contracting party under
Content ID and is legally bound by YouTube’s Terms of Service, the second level agreement might not affect her legal status at all.83 One might
argue that the Content ID claimant is simply tolerating infringement or
granting a waiver to users. Facially, both theories have some merit, but
ultimately they are inappropriate.
The term “tolerated use” was coined by Professor Tim Wu to describe
“infringing usage of a copyrighted work of which the copyright owner may
be aware, yet does nothing about.”84 The copyright owner seeks neither to
stop the activity nor to be compensated for it.85 A cursory glance at Content
ID suggests infringing user-creators are being tolerated: a monetizing claimant is at least constructively aware of infringing use, chooses to allow the
videos to remain on YouTube when she could easily have them removed
or blocked, and does not seek compensation from user-creators.
Waiver is an affirmative defense to a copyright infringement claim.86 It
is “the intentional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its
existence and the intent to relinquish it.”87 Waiver “refers only to a decision
not to enforce rights against a particular party.”88 There is scant case law
81

See Lev-Aretz, supra note 3, at 153–54.
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83
Lev-Aretz, supra note 3, at 139.
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Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617, 619 (2008).
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on the waiver doctrine, but in Courtney-Clarke v. Rizzoli International
Publications, Inc.,89 a New York appellate court shed some light on what
it means to express an intent to relinquish a known right. The court held
that the Plaintiff’s intent to relinquish her known right to a royalty rate in a
publishing agreement could not be inferred from her “mere silence, oversight or thoughtlessness in failing to object to the lower royalty rate she had
been receiving.”90 Courtney-Clark suggests that opting into Content ID
and receiving some payment from YouTube does not evidence a copyright
owner’s intent to relinquish her right to the full value of payments due
directly from infringing users.
The flaw in both of the foregoing theories is that they ignore the basic
purpose of the second level agreement: Content ID claimants only profit if
and when users upload infringing videos. That users will infringe is a basic
assumption of the contract. The copyright owner is not sitting on her rights
against the user-creator in exchange for nothing or for less than optimum
payment; she is sitting on her rights precisely so that she can maximize payment in the form of shared ad revenue. The second level agreement is a new
licensing device developed in response to a relatively new market.91 Prior to
Content ID, media giants actively tried to quash infringement directly by submitting individual takedown notices and indirectly by suing YouTube.92 Now
many of those media giants are authorizing the very same infringement via
Content ID.93 It is too formalistic to conclude that copyright owners are authorizing what they consider to be secondary infringement without impliedly
authorizing the inseparable direct infringement. Therefore, tolerated use and
waiver are inappropriate, and the arrangement is more properly described by
a contract theory that recognizes the user-creator as an intended beneficiary.
B. Implied License Theory
This Note advocates a contract theory that relies on the implied license
doctrine. Admittedly, courts are reluctant to find implied licenses,94 but
Content ID presents a factual scenario that lends itself well to application of
the doctrine. The second level agreement is a radically new licensing tool occupying the edge of copyright law; therefore, it is not so radical to employ a
licensing doctrine that also occupies the edge of the law. This subsection of
89
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the Note will argue that the guiding principles of contract law—party intent
and equity—are best served by the implied license theory.
In her article, Second Level Agreements, Yafit Lev-Aretz presents the
first ever in-depth legal analysis of second level agreements.95 She highlights
their novelty, acknowledges that they might create implied licenses between
copyright owners and users (using Content ID as a case study), and concludes
that their future is dim because UGC does not generate much ad revenue.96
This Note challenges two aspects of Lev-Aretz’s analysis. First, the implied
license theory has more merit than she gives it. Second, determining the legal
significance of second level agreements is not irrelevant merely because of
declining profits in the original setting for which they were created or because
law suits are unlikely so long as they are in place. Second level agreements
are unprecedented in the world of copyright licensing,97 and the nature of the
Internet as an ever-evolving marketplace promises that new applications not
yet contemplated will emerge. For those reasons, the legal significance of
second level agreements cannot be discounted.
In his article, Using the Implied License to Inject Common Sense into
Digital Copyright, John S. Sieman traces the evolution of the implied
license doctrine and predicts that courts will extend it further to resolve
fundamental conflicts between copyright law and Internet technology.98
Content ID is ripe for testing the limits of the modern doctrine as applied
to Internet technology.
1. Effects Test
The leading case on the traditional implied license doctrine is Effects
Associates, Inc. v. Cohen.99 Under the Effects test, an implied nonexclusive
license is created “when (1) a person (the licensee) requests the creation of a
work, (2) the creator (the licensor) makes that particular work and delivers it
to the licensee who requested it, and (3) the licensor intends that the licensee
copy and distribute his work.”100 The Effects test contemplates direct contact
between two parties and the creation of a new, copyrighted work. Looking
95

See Lev-Aretz, supra note 3, at 138–39.
Id. at 158–59, 180–82.
97
See id. at 139 (“While licenses for the purpose of pure reproduction are common in
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John S. Sieman, Comment, Using the Implied License to Inject Common Sense into
Digital Copyright, 85 N.C. L. REV. 885 (2007).
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908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990).
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Sieman, supra note 98, at 899 (citing Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., LLC,
284 F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 2002)); see also Effects Assoc., Inc., 908 F.2d at 558–59.
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at the Effects test alone, Content ID is a rough fit: there are three parties to
the arrangement, they are not in direct contact, and the user-creator makes
a derivative work from the licensor’s original.
Courts have expanded the implied license doctrine beyond the Effects
test in two ways, making the doctrine more amenable to the facts of Content
ID.101 First, other circuits following the Effects test have placed special emphasis on the third prong: the licensor’s intent.102 Given the difficulty of shoehorning Content ID into the classic Effects test, the intent-based approach is
more useful. Second, modern courts have been willing to modify and extend the implied license doctrine even further in cases involving “nontraditional circumstances.”103
2. Field Test
In Field v. Google, Inc.,104 a federal district court was presented with very
nontraditional circumstances. Plaintiff Blake Field created and copyrighted
a number of works, put them on a website, and allowed Google to create
cached copies of the site—and therefore his copyrighted works—by failing
to opt out of Google’s “indexing” robot.105 Sieman explains that:
[i]ndexing is the term used to describe how search engines collect data.
Search engines have automated programs called “robots” (or “spiders”)
that visit as many websites as they can discover. For each one, the robot
copies the page onto a computer owned by the search engine and creates
an index of all the data on the page. All of this data is then ordered so that
when users search for the data, the search engine can find it efficiently.106

Google provides instructions on how to opt out,107 which can be done in a
variety of ways.108 Field admitted that he knew of the opt-out system, but
did not use it.109
101

Id. at 899–901.
Id. at 899 n.89 (citing John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc., 322
F.3d 26, 40 (1st Cir. 2003) (“The touchstone for finding an implied license ... is intent.”);
Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., LLC, 284 F.3d 505, at 515 (calling intent “the
determinative question”); Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 502 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Without
intent, there can be no implied license.”)).
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Id. at 900–01, 906–15 (discussing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004) and Field v. Google, 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006)).
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412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).
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The Field court radically departed from the Effects test, establishing a
new implied license test based on licensor conduct.110 Under the Field test,
an implied license is created “[w]hen the copyright owner (1) ‘knows of the
use’ and (2) ‘encourages it.’”111 “Knowledge” and “encouragement” were
interpreted very broadly.112 The court found that Field had “knowledge” of
Google’s use by his own admission.113 Sieman, on the other hand, characterized the court’s analysis of the knowledge prong thusly: “Field satisfied the
knowledge requirement by knowing of Google’s use of the opt-out system
to determine what to cache and what not to cache.”114 The court found that
Field “encouraged” the use by knowing how to opt out and failing to do
so, thereby making “a conscious decision to permit” Google to cache his
webpage.115 Sieman summarizes the Field test as creating the following
rule: “[W]here a copyright owner ... knows about an opt-out system ... and
purposely fails to opt out, an implied license is created.”116
3. Applying the Field Test to Content ID
Even the Field test presents a small wrinkle when applied to Content ID:
Field involved only two parties, whereas second level agreements involve
three parties. But this wrinkle can be ironed out with the fact that privity is not
required to create an implied license.117 Even if the second level agreement’s
terms purport to exclude the user-creator, the agreement grants rights to
YouTube that are inseparable from the user’s content.118 That is, copyright
owners authorize YouTube to display and perform user-created derivative
works. Because privity is not required to create an implied license, the fact
that the copyright owner communicates directly only with YouTube when
she opts into Content ID does not preclude the grant of an implied license to
allegedly infringing user-creators.119 Accordingly, Content ID should be analyzed under the Field test, using evidence of both contracting parties’ conduct toward the user-creator.
110
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The agreements between YouTube and copyright owners are opaque;
users can only divine the terms of these agreements from a few press releases and media reports.120 Users are legally bound by YouTube’s Terms
of Service,121 which do not reflect the existence of second level agreements.122 For example, YouTube’s Terms of Service prohibit uploaders,
without qualification, from uploading videos containing copyrighted materials that they have not been authorized to use.123
Despite such unequivocal language, YouTube’s conduct absolutely reflects second level agreements because user videos containing “unauthorized”
copyrighted material are treated differently depending on whether that material is in the Content ID system.124 Even without opting into Content ID, a
copyright owner may notify YouTube of an infringing video and have it
blocked.125 The user will be notified that her video was identified as infringing, and she will receive a “copyright strike” on her YouTube account.126 If
a user accumulates three copyright strikes, her account and all the videos
uploaded under that account will be removed.127 On the other hand, users
do not receive copyright strikes for videos matched through Content ID, no
matter which option the claimant selected.128 YouTube’s Help guide even
explains: “Copyright strikes are often confused with Content ID matches,
which can result in a video being blocked. They are not the same.”129 In
other words, a video affected by Content ID does not carry the same account
penalties threatened by YouTube’s Terms of Service. Moreover, the user
receives some notification that the video has been matched using Content
ID, affirmatively telling her that YouTube and the copyright owner have
detected the video. There can be no inference that the lack of reprimand is
merely because the video has gone unnoticed by interested parties. All of
this conduct would lead the user to reasonably infer that despite what the
Terms of Service declare, it is sometimes acceptable to upload copyrighted
material that she has not personally acquired permission to use.130
120
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In light of the foregoing, the monetizing claimant satisfies the Field test.
The claimant’s knowledge of YouTube users’ use can be inferred from her
decision to opt into Content ID. After all, YouTube is adamant that Content ID is appropriate for those who hold “exclusive rights to a substantial
body of original material that is frequently uploaded by the YouTube user
community.”131 Monetizing claimants particularly encourage fraudulent use
by knowing how to opt out—either by filing claims against individual videos,
which would result in copyright strikes, or by selecting “block” under
Content ID—and failing to do so, thereby making a “conscious decision to
permit” users’ use.132
The scope of the implied license of course should be limited by
YouTube’s Terms of Service and the information YouTube reveals about
Content ID to users on its website. For example, YouTube’s help guide alerts
users that a Content ID claimant “may change the policy being applied to
your video at any time.”133
IV. CONTENT ID ABUSE
Content ID is an effort by major industry players to contract around
federal copyright law. Copyright and contract law have “long co-existed
symbiotically.”134 In the last fifteen years, however, courts and commentators
have debated the enforceability of contractual license terms that “alter the
‘delicate balance’ of rights that the Copyright Act strikes between owners
and users of works of authorship.”135 The second level agreement is an unprecedented form of copyright license because the user-creator is not a party
to the license.136 Courts have been unreceptive to preemption of contract
claims,137 but the common rationale for courts’ reticence might not insulate
the exotic, new second level agreement.
131
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Persistent Content ID abuse casts doubt on whether Content ID squares
with federal copyright policy. Content ID does not seem to conflict with
copyright policy when it comes to limiting YouTube’s secondary infringement liability. The DMCA138 was intended in part to balance the interests of
copyright owners and ISPs with regard to secondary liability. It is reasonable to view the DMCA as a set of default rules, which parties ought to be
free to contract around.139 However, Content ID abuse does seem to conflict
with copyright policy when it comes to balancing the interests of authors
(copyright owners) and future creators (users). Content ID abuse refers to
intentionally false Content ID claims, often of public domain works.140
False claimants can monopolize and profit from works on YouTube that
they do not actually own.141 Because Content ID lacks front-end copyright
ownership verification and operates outside of the copyright statutes unless
and until a user disputes a claim,142 claimants can acquire temporary contractual rights to monopolize and profit from works in the public domain.
YouTube’s dispute process ultimately defers to the DMCA, which generally
halts abusive claims.143 But without front-end copyright ownership verification, Content ID creates a marketplace in which individuals can monopolize
public domain works in direct contravention of federal copyright law.
Most inaccurate Content ID matches flow from two fundamental flaws
in the Content ID system. The first flaw is technological: over-filtering. In a
nutshell, over-filtering is a false positive.144 Although a pet peeve of users, it
is grudgingly tolerated because Content ID’s software, like all software, is
not infallible. The second flaw is procedural: Content ID abuse. Content ID
claimants need not prove copyright ownership in the application process,
allowing unscrupulous parties to lay claim to whatever materials they wish.145
Public domain works are the false claim of choice among documented, repeat
abusers.146 Content ID abuse is less tolerated by users because YouTube
138
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could eliminate it by implementing front-end verification, but simply chooses
not to.
Regardless of whether an inaccurate Content ID match flows from overfiltering or from abuse, the real aggrieved party is the user whose noninfringing video is improperly blocked or monetized. Accordingly, Content
ID arguably clashes with some of copyright law’s core goals: balancing the
interests of authors and future creators and protecting free use of public
domain works.147 There is no common law theory to cure this conflict. It
can only be remedied by modifications to Content ID’s application process
and policies. This Part of the Note explains how Content ID’s dispute process works, why it alone is not enough to cure the conflict with federal
copyright law, and what steps YouTube should take to cure the conflict.
A. Content ID Dispute Process
1. As a Solution to Over-Filtering
Content ID’s dispute process is a sensible solution to the over-filtering
problem and upholds copyright policy. To understand why, a brief explanation of the dispute process—especially the recent changes to it—is necessary.
In October 2012, YouTube announced its much-anticipated reforms to
the Content ID dispute process.148 The old process was roundly criticized in
tech blogs and the YouTube help forum.149 It effectively circumvented the
DMCA notice-and-takedown process, trapping users in a back-and-forth that
gave Content ID claimants the last word. The user filed a dispute, the Content
ID claimant could “confirm” her claim to the video, and that was the end of
it.150 Because there is no statutory right to upload or monetize videos online,
this was certainly a bad business practice, but not illegal.151 The reform is
arguably an attempt by YouTube to balance users’ interests under Content ID
and it aligns Content ID more closely with copyright policy.
The new dispute process replaces unilateral “confirmation” with a formal
DMCA notice-and-takedown claim.152 Now YouTube defers to user disputes, giving the claimant two options: release the Content ID claim or file
an official DMCA notification to override the dispute.153 The new process
147
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injects human review into the system, providing a cost-effective remedy to
the over-filtering problem, which appears to be a genuine limitation of modern filtering technology. In other words, imperfect technology is to blame
for over-filtering, and the new dispute process relies on honest claimants and
users to police innocent, technological errors. Requiring copyright owners
and users to be the first line of defense against over-filtering maintains the
DMCA’s policy against over-burdening ISPs with policing copyrighted
content on their sites.154
2. As a Solution to Abuse
The dispute process is not as sensible a solution to the false claim problem. Unlike over-filtering, false claims need not be dealt with on a video-byvideo basis. Over-filtering requires human review to assess why Content ID
matched a particular video and whether the match is justified. In contrast,
matches arising from false claims are unjustified in every case.
In the case of Content ID abuse, the underlying second level agreement
is unenforceable because the claimant purports to convey rights to YouTube
that it does not own. It is not, therefore, a classic preemption issue, which
would involve a true licensor attempting to expand its monopoly or restrict
licensee rights in a way that contradicts federal copyright law.155 If the concern was the harm to YouTube, the remedy would almost certainly be a
matter of contract law.156 But the concern is the harm to users, in the form of
time spent disputing false claims and money lost from an inability to monetize non-infringing videos. Applying principles of equity, a court might be
willing to invalidate the entire second level agreement scheme due to its potential to exert control over non-negotiating parties in contravention of federal copyright policy.
Courts have been unreceptive to preemption of contract claims, reasoning “that because contracts contain an element of agreement and bind only
those in privity, contract claims are qualitatively different from copyright
claims.”157 Second level agreements, if found to create an implied license
between the copyright owner and the user-creator, may risk preemption because they affect a third party not in privity with any party to the express
agreement. If YouTube wants to prevent Content ID from becoming a test
154
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case for invalidating second level agreements on preemption grounds, it
should proactively correct the interest imbalance its system creates. Specifically, false claims should be weeded out on the front-end and there should
be clearly delineated consequences for abusers.
B. Proposed Changes to Content ID
One reason YouTube has been hesitant to fix Content ID abuse may be
the obvious conflict of interest: YouTube stands to gain more from maintaining a claimant-friendly application procedure. Pursuing false claimants
to recover shared revenue already paid out or creating barriers on the front
end to prevent false claims in the first place will probably result in a net loss
for YouTube. YouTube evidently considers front-end verification to be too
costly and prefers to rely solely on its dispute process, as it is legally entitled
to do.
Despite strict verification requirements for other modes of monetization,158 YouTube evidently believes the honor system is sufficient to regulate Content ID. Against the backdrop of its creation outlined in this Note,
this is not surprising. Content ID was designed to convert potential courtroom
opponents into allies as quickly and easily as possible. Its central purpose
is to limit YouTube’s liability, and because users have no readily apparent
cause of action against YouTube for paying false claimants, YouTube has
no economic impetus to guard against such abuse. In YouTube’s defense,
the site’s economic model compels this result: users can upload and consume
unlimited videos free of charge, and the legal protection and ad revenue
YouTube receives from partnering with copyright owners through Content
ID powers the machine. YouTube’s enormous user base159 means that those
comparatively few affected users who vote with their feet and leave the site
cannot threaten its continued operation. But second level agreements are
yet untested, and YouTube should avoid knowingly contravening federal
copyright policy if it wants to maintain the status quo.
Two changes to Content ID would close the loophole, bringing the service into harmony with federal copyright law. First, YouTube should require
proof of copyright registration in the Content ID application process. This
could be as simple as entering a U.S. or international registration number.
Because Content ID was originally “designed for exclusive rights holders
158

McKay, supra note 16 (“YouTube has quite stringent copyright verification procedures for users wishing to qualify for partnership status and monetize the videos on their
channel.”).
159
Lev-Aretz, supra note 3, at 155 (“[As of 2012], YouTube is the world’s largest repository for video clips on the Internet, with over 48 hours of video uploaded to YouTube
every 60 seconds and hundreds of millions of videos watched every day.”).

328

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:305

whose content is frequently uploaded to YouTube by the user community,”
this would not be an onerous requirement for many claimants.160 YouTube
could conduct automated searches for each claim using online databases.
Second, YouTube needs to articulate a clear policy for Content ID
abusers. Currently, YouTube’s website meekly and vaguely warns potential
Content ID claimants: “Content owners who repeatedly make erroneous
claims can have their Content ID access disabled and their partnership with
YouTube terminated.”161 When a user disputes a match because she believes an abuser has claimed a public domain work, YouTube should conduct a registration search. If indeed the claim was abusive, YouTube should
automatically release that claim from the Content ID system—not just
from the disputed video—and give that claimant a “copyright strike.” If a
claimant receives three strikes, her YouTube account should be terminated
and she should be permanently blocked from partnering with Content ID.
An unscrupulous claimant could, with some effort, set up a new account and
seek Content ID partnership using a different name, IP address, email address, and bank account information. Many of the biggest abusers, however,
act as Content ID clearinghouses for a large number of genuine copyright
owners.162 The burden of re-filing a long list of genuine claims after partnership termination hopefully would be a sufficient inconvenience to the
businesses to curb the practice of making false claims.
CONCLUSION
Because second level agreements diminish the need for copyright owners
to resort to litigation over UGC platforms, Lev-Aretz argues there is no practical need to determine the legal contours of these exotic, new contracts.163
But the Internet and second level agreements will continue to evolve, and
the economic model will probably continue to encourage the expressly contracting parties to look out for their interests alone. The phenomenon of second level agreements—the first arrangement in copyright history whereby
“a user creates a derivative work pursuant to a license that was not granted
directly to her”164—may remain isolated on UGC platforms, and its impact
on the average UGC platform user may decline, exactly as Lev-Aretz predicts.165 But the phenomenon may evolve and expand, and the agreement’s
legal contours eventually will be tested in court.
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162
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Id. at 140 (“[A]dvertisers have found that original and derivative UGC is far less
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Not knowing how the agreements will be tested, this Note highlights the
main legal issues that the agreements raise in the Content ID context. The
express contracting parties should be prepared for courts to find that the
third party creator cannot be legally excluded from a license. The expressly
contracting parties should also be prepared for a court to invalidate a contract formation system that turns a blind eye to contraventions of federal
copyright policy in the name of making fast money.
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began to search for new revenue generators in the form of professionally produced content and the importance of UGC in the licensing priority has diminished.”).
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